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Government Falsehoods, Democratic Harm, And 
the Constitution 
HELEN NORTON* 
The government’s lies inflict injuries that differ in both degree and kind 
from those caused by nongovernmental parties’ lies. In other words, the 
government’s intentional and reckless falsehoods threaten distinct and 
especially serious harms—both to individual targets and to the public more 
broadly—precisely because of their governmental source. How, if at all, does 
the Constitution address the government’s harmful falsehoods? Caroline Mala 
Corbin investigates this important question in The Unconstitutionality of 
Government Propaganda.1 
THE GOVERNMENT’S FALSEHOODS THAT INJURE IDENTIFIABLE 
INDIVIDUALS IN PARTICULARIZED WAYS 
At times, the government deploys falsehoods as weapons to punish its 
enemies and critics or to coerce its targets’ waiver of their rights. Illustrations 
include the Mississippi State Sovereignty Commission’s defamatory lies—
alleging financial, sexual, and legal misconduct—to the employers, friends, and 
neighbors of those who fought segregation in the 1950s and 1960s.2 And the 
FBI’s false threats to African-American editor and journalist Charlotta Bass 
during World War II that her newspaper would be shut down “if she continued 
to equate the fight against Nazism with that for civil rights at home.”3 And, more 
recently, New Orleans prosecutors’ fake subpoenas (delivered by police officers 
to pressure crime victims and potential witnesses into coming forward) that 
falsely stated “A fine and imprisonment may be imposed for failure to obey this 
notice.”4 
Courts have recognized that the Constitution can constrain the 
government’s lies and other expressive choices that inflict these sorts of 
individualized injuries. While recognizing that the First Amendment does not—
indeed, as a practical matter, could not—bar the government from expressing 
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its own views when doing the government’s business,5 the Supreme Court has 
also clarified that  
[A] government’s ability to express itself is [not] without restriction. 
Constitutional and statutory provisions outside of the Free Speech Clause may 
limit government speech. And the Free Speech Clause itself may constrain the 
government’s speech if, for example, the government seeks to compel private 
persons to convey the government’s speech.6 
More specifically, courts have held that the government violates the Free 
Speech Clause when its falsehoods cause nongovernmental third parties to fire 
or otherwise retaliate against its critics, when its verbal “campaigns of 
harassment and humiliation” are reasonably likely to deter its targets’ protected 
speech, and when its threats of punishment silence its critics’ speech as 
effectively as actual punishment.7 
The Due Process Clause offers an additional check on governmental lies 
that effectively deprive their targets of their liberties. Examples include law 
enforcement officers’ lies to those in custody that coerce their targets’ 
involuntary waiver of constitutional rights, and governmental falsehoods that 
deny their targets’ meaningful exercise of voting rights or unduly burden 
women’s exercise of their reproductive rights.8 
THE GOVERNMENT’S FALSEHOODS THAT INFLICT DEMOCRATIC HARM  
In contrast, some of the government’s falsehoods inflict collective harms 
upon the general public. More specifically, the government’s intentional or 
reckless falsehoods can frustrate democratic self-governance when they deny 
the public the information it needs to hold the government accountable for its 
performance. Think, for example, of the government’s lies told to stymie 
political and legal accountability for its misconduct. Think too of governmental 
efforts to undermine public confidence in truth-seeking institutions—like the 
press, inspectors general, health professionals, and scientists more generally—
that may challenge the government’s preferred narrative. Examples here include 
the government’s false attacks on its critics, opponents, and watchdogs,9 as well 
as its falsehoods about a wide variety of facts that seek not only to persuade 
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listeners that a particular false assertion is true but also to inculcate listeners’ 
doubt about the possibility of truth more generally. To be sure, U.S. government 
speakers are not alone in exploiting these sorts of lies for partisan ends, as these 
expressive strategies feature prominently in the playbook of authoritarian 
regimes that spread “disinformation” for political and military ends.10 
Professor Corbin rightly worries about the government’s falsehoods that 
interfere with democratic functions and institutions. As she explains: 
We are able to hold our government officials accountable because we can vote 
them, or those who appointed them, out of office. In order for our consent-by-
vote to be genuine, we need to know what those entrusted to serve us have 
done. By making it harder to unearth the truth and harder to see it and believe 
it when it does see the light of day, government propaganda hampers this 
fundamental democratic process.11 
Additionally, she writes: 
[T]he onslaught of government propaganda destabilizes truth itself, which not 
only hinders the press’s ability to perform its watchdog function, but also 
discourages people from even seeking the truth in the first place. Indeed, this 
destabilization of truth, along with repetition, cognitive shortcuts, echo 
chambers, and motivated reasoning, helps explain why government 
propaganda succeeds. The end result is failure to hold government accountable. 
Instead of an informed electorate giving or withholding its genuine consent at 
the ballot box, an ill-informed electorate may be giving or withholding a 
manipulated or falsified consent.12 
The government’s falsehoods thus inflict democratic harm when they deny 
the public the information necessary to hold the government accountable for its 
misconduct, undermine citizens’ ability to make informed voting choices, 
sabotage the policymaking process when participants cannot rely on others’ 
assertions, and foster public cynicism about (and disengagement from) 
democratic self-governance.13 
These falsehoods inflict democratic harm not only by frustrating the 
people’s ability to translate their preferences into political change, but also by 
breaching the relationship of trust between governors and governed promised 
by a healthy democracy. “The people are the source of the government’s 
authority and (under various substantial restrictions) even of its policies,” moral 
philosopher Bernard Williams reminds us. “Government is in some sense a 
trust; there is a special relationship between government and people, and it is a 
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 13 See JOHN L. MEARSHEIMER, WHY LEADERS LIE 84–86 (2011). 
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violation of this conception for secrecy or falsehood to come between trustee 
and people.”14 
In short, we expect our government to refrain from speaking in ways that 
frustrate democracy. Whether our expectations are constitutionally enforceable, 
however, is a separate question. 
NONCONSTITUTIONAL REMEDIES FOR THE DEMOCRATIC HARMS OF THE 
GOVERNMENT’S FALSEHOODS 
Of course, courts are neither the only nor necessarily the best recourse when 
we’re unhappy, even infuriated, with our government and its expressive choices. 
Other government actors can (and sometimes do) address some of the 
government’s lies through statute, counter-speech, even impeachment.15 And 
nongovernmental actors can (and sometimes do) exercise their power to resist 
and rebut the government’s destructive speech. To illustrate, in the summer of 
2020 as I write this essay, social media platform Twitter labeled two of President 
Trump’s posts regarding mail-in voting as “potentially misleading,” and shortly 
thereafter tagged Trump’s tweets on the George Floyd protests in Minneapolis 
with a warning that the tweet “violated the Twitter Rules about glorifying 
violence.” At the same time, Facebook CEO Mark Zuckerberg’s refusal to 
moderate Trump’s posts met with angry outcries by many of its current and 
former employees: some Facebook employees threatened to resign if Mr. 
Zuckerberg did not reverse his position, while others participated in a virtual 
walkout in protest. Whether any of these efforts will influence the government’s 
expressive choices, or the democratic harm they sometimes inflict, remains to 
be seen. 
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This might lead one to think that the government’s falsehoods call for 
political solutions (like campaigning and voting against governmental liars) 
rather than legal solutions that take the form of constitutional litigation. But the 
better understanding, in Corbin’s opinion—and mine—is that the Constitution 
has something to say about the government’s choices that subvert democracy. 
Indeed, political remedies offer limited respite from the democratic harms of the 
government’s lies that successfully thwart political accountability, and the 
government has additional political incentive to engage in these lies when its 
preferred constituencies reward them. Judicial review thus provides a critically 
important check on the government’s choices that inflict democratic harm while 
evading democratic accountability. Along these lines, many thoughtful 
commentators have wrestled with how and when the Constitution constrains the 
government’s choices that inflict collective democratic harm in contexts like 
campaign finance reform, gerrymandering, and election law more generally.16 
CONSTITUTIONAL RESPONSES (AND THEIR LIMITS) TO THE DEMOCRATIC 
HARMS OF THE GOVERNMENT’S FALSEHOODS 
Even so, constitutional law is notoriously limited in its ability to address 
diffuse or collective harms. The democratic harms of the government’s 
falsehoods thus resist redress through traditional constitutional litigation 
precisely because those harms are so large and generalized in scope.  
Some background may be of help. As a threshold matter, the Supreme 
Court’s justiciability doctrine holds that federal courts do not have the 
constitutional power to adjudicate a claim unless the plaintiff alleges a “concrete 
and particularized,” rather than generalized, injury.17 This doctrine seeks, 
among other objectives, to channel collective grievances to the political process 
for redress. For this reason, the government’s falsehoods that inflict more 
concrete and individualized harms may be more amenable to constraint through 
constitutional litigation18 than its falsehoods that inflict democratic, and thus 
more generalized, harms. 
A related question involves whether and when nongovernmental speakers’ 
lies threaten harm sufficient to justify the government’s punishment consistent 
 
 16 See United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 153 n.4 (1938) (noting that 
“prejudice against discrete and insular minorities may be a special condition, which tends 
seriously to curtail the operation of those political processes ordinarily to be relied upon to 
protect minorities, and which may call for a correspondingly more searching judicial 
inquiry”); see generally JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF 
JUDICIAL REVIEW (1980) (emphasizing the importance of judicial review to protect those 
who are unable to protect themselves from majorities through the political process). 
 17 Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992). 
 18 See, e.g., Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123 (1951) 
(recognizing organizational challengers’ standing based on their allegations that the federal 
government’s speech designating them as Communist front organizations injured their 
reputation, and thus their ability to recruit members and raise funds). 
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with the First Amendment. More specifically, the Court has signaled that a 
private party’s intentional falsehood must inflict “legally cognizable” harm like 
reputational harm (in the context of defamation), financial harm (in the context 
of fraud), or physical injury (recall Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes’s familiar 
example of falsely shouting “fire” in a crowded theater19) before the First 
Amendment permits the government to restrain it.20 Although the government 
(unlike private parties) has no First Amendment rights of its own, the Court’s 
insistence on a showing of harm in this context reflects concerns relevant to the 
government’s lies as well—more specifically, its search for limiting principles 
to protect valuable speech (governmental or otherwise) from chilling effects and 
to restrain the partisan excesses of courts, other government actors, and litigants. 
Just as courts sometimes fear the overreach of an Orwellian government’s 
Ministry of Truth in regulating our own speech,21 they may also worry that 
constitutional constraints on the government’s speech will both offend 
separation of powers principles and invite opportunistic and abusive litigation 
by governmental critics who themselves have a tenuous relationship with 
accuracy and fairness. 
For these reasons, as I’ve written elsewhere, some of the government’s most 
catastrophic lies are those most “resistant to redress.”22 I find this deeply 
frustrating. Professor Corbin does too. 
Like Corbin, I have long felt that the threats sometimes posed by the 
government’s speech are both real and underappreciated—indeed, the 
government’s speech can be more dangerous than our speech precisely because 
of its governmental source. And, like Corbin, I find that the Supreme Court’s 
current doctrine fails to grapple fully with the ways in which the government’s 
speech sometimes affirmatively threatens constitutional commitments. And we 
both think that various strands of constitutional theory and precedent offer 
opportunities to address this failure. 
To this end, elsewhere I’ve proposed that we ask and answer a series of 
questions about the consequences of, and the motivations underlying, the 
government’s speech when thinking about whether and when that speech 
violates the Constitution.23 
When we look at the effects of the government’s speech, I propose that we 
ask whether the government’s speech has altered its targets’ choices and 
opportunities to their disadvantage, and whether a specific constitutional 
provision forbids the government from causing such harm. Think, for example, 
of the government’s threats that silence dissenters as effectively as jailing them, 
 
 19 See Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919) (“The most stringent protection 
of free speech would not protect a man in falsely shouting fire in a theatre and causing a 
panic.”). 
 20 See United States v. Alvarez, 567 U.S. 709, 719 (2012) (plurality opinion). 
 21 See id. at 723. 
 22 NORTON, supra note 7, at 134. 
 23 See generally id. The next three paragraphs’ discussion draws extensively from that 
work. 
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the government’s lies that pressure its targets into relinquishing their 
constitutional rights as effectively as denying those rights outright, or the 
government’s religious speech that coerces listeners’ participation in prayer or 
other religious observance as effectively as fining or taxing those who fail to 
partake. 
Under certain constitutional understandings, moreover, the government’s 
speech may violate specific constitutional provisions when it inflicts expressive, 
or dignitary, harm upon its targets: think here of the government’s speech, 
including but not limited to its falsehoods, that communicates a message of 
disrespect or hostility to its targets based on who they are or what they believe. 
We can also look at the government’s motives for speaking and ask why the 
government chose to speak in a certain way, and whether a specific 
constitutional provision denies the government the power to speak for that 
reason. This can be the case, for example, of the government’s speech intended 
to interfere with constitutionally protected rights, as well as to advance some 
religions at the expense of others or to harm members of unpopular groups. 
Focusing on the government’s purposes when speaking also offers a plausible 
limiting principle (one that interests Corbin too): although government speakers 
(along with the rest of us) need some breathing room to make honest mistakes, 
we need not leave them room for intentional or reckless falsehoods. 
No doubt there are alternative approaches to the constitutional problems 
raised by the government’s speech, and I hope others will continue to explore 
those possibilities.24 Professor Corbin’s article does exactly that.  
To this end, Corbin’s article thoughtfully explores whether and when we 
should understand the Free Speech Clause to prohibit what she calls “the 
government’s propaganda”—that is, “the government’s knowing or reckless 
propagation of verifiably false or misleading statements of fact on matters of 
public concern.”25 
Drawing from the Free Speech Clause doctrine that applies to the 
government’s regulation of nongovernmental speakers, Corbin seeks to capture 
the universe of governmental lies most likely to inflict democratic harms. She 
thus proposes that courts apply strict scrutiny to the government’s speech that 
intentionally or recklessly asserts a verifiably false or misleading statement of 
fact on a matter of public concern. As she observes, the Court’s doctrine already 
requires judges to make these assessments “albeit not all at the same time”26 
(and albeit not always without difficulty). These assessments thus do “not 
 
 24 For instance, in addition to the Free Speech Clause and Due Process Clause 
constraints identified supra notes 2–7 and accompanying text, we might also explore 
Article II’s requirement that the President “take Care that the laws be faithfully executed” 
and Article IV’s guarantee to every state “a Republican form of government” as possible 
constraints on governmental falsehoods that inflict democratic harm. To be sure, these 
possibilities would rely less on precedent or historical practice than on methodologies 
emphasizing constitutional structure, purpose, pragmatism, and ethics. 
 25 Corbin, supra note 1, at 818. 
 26 Id. at 829. 
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require difficult and novel determinations of what amounts to self-interest, or 
evaluation of problematic emotions, or manipulation of cognitive errors” such 
that courts “need not engage in line-drawing beyond their institutional 
competence.”27 Moreover, as she points out, the government is a hardy and self-
interested speaker, and thus unlikely to be easily silenced; indeed, there’s value 




Along with Professor Corbin, I feel that the government’s falsehoods can—
and sometimes do—inflict serious democratic harm, and that political remedies 
for such harm are decidedly limited. Even as she and I suggest different 
frameworks for addressing the constitutional challenges posed by the 
government’s lies, this shared concern inspires our ongoing efforts to identify 
the Constitution’s constraints on the government’s choices to wield its 
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 28 See Int’l Refugee Assistance Project v. Trump, 857 F.3d 554, 600 (4th Cir. 2017) 
(“To the extent that our review chills campaign promises to condemn and exclude entire 
religious groups, we think that a welcome restraint.”), vacated and remanded, 138  S. Ct. 
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